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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I .

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an administrative commercial driver's license

disqualification case.

Raymond Scott Peck (herein "Peck" or

"Appellant") appeals from the decision of the Idaho Department of
Transportation in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Preliminary Order entered the 18th day of May, 2012,
disqualifying Peck from operating a commercial motor vehicle for
a period of one year ("CDL disqualification") and from the
decision of the District Court in the Opinion And Order On
Petition For Judicial Review, entered February 4, 2013, upholding
the CDL disqualification of Peck.

II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A Notice of Disqualification dated December 15, 2009 was

mailed by the Idaho Transportation Department ("lTD") to Peck
pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-335.

Agency R. Pg. l/Clerk R. Pg 34.

Peck timely requested a hearing on the issue of disqualification
(Agency R. Pg. 2/Clerk R. Pg 35).

The proceedings on the

disqualification were put on hold pending the outcome of the
Administrative License Suspension ("ALS") challenge also brought
by Peck.

Following the confirmation of the ALS suspension by the

Idaho Court of Appeals, the Disqualification hearing was held on
May 15, 2012 before hearing officer Michael Howell.

Tr. 5/15/12.

On or about May 18, 2012, the hearing officer for the Idaho
Transportation Department entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order sustaining the
disqualification by lTD.
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Agency R. Pgs. 16-20/Clerk R. Pg 49-53.

Peck filed his Petition For Judicial Review And Ex Parte
Application For Stay Of Agency Decision on June 5, 2012 with the
District Court.

Agency R. Pgs. 21-29/Clerk R. Pgs. 9-17.

Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court
issued its Opinion And Order On Petition For Judicial Review on
February 4, 2013 upholding the CDL disqualification.
Pgs. 117-125.

Clerk R.

This appeal by Peck timely follows.

III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Petitioner Raymond Scott Peck is a resident of Bonner
County, Idaho.

The Petitioner Peck was arrested and cited for

allegedly driving under the influence in violation of Idaho Code
on or about December 2, 2009.

The criminal charges were resolved

in the criminal case proceedings.
Also, the arresting Officer issued on December 2, 2009 and
served an ALS Notice of Suspension upon Peck on or about December
3, 2009, purporting to suspend the driving privileges of the Peck
for a period of 90 days set to commence 30 days from December 3,
2009 pursuant to Idaho Code, Title 18, Chapter 80 (herein "ALS
Suspension").

The ALS Suspension was upheld on appeal in Peck v.

State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 153 Idaho 37
(Ct .App. 2012).
The Respondent State of Idaho Department of Transportation,
on December 15, 2009 served Peck by U.S. Mail a Notice of
Disqualification of CDL privileges pursuant to Idaho Code Title
49, Chapter 3 (herein "COL Disqualification"). Agency R. Pg.
l/Clerk R. Pg 34.
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A telephonic hearing on the CDL Disqualification was held on
May 15, 2012 with Idaho Transportation Department Hearing Officer
Michael B. Howell.
Disqualification.

The Hearing Officer upheld the CDL
The matter proceeded to judicial review.

The

District Court upheld the CDL Disqualification.
As it relates to the CDL Disqualification, at the time of
the traffic stop on December 2, 2009, the uncontested evidence
from the 5/15/2012 Transcript of the hearing before the lTD
Hearing Officer is as follows:
1.

Peck held a commercial driver's license.

P. 3, L. 12-

14.
2.

Peck was not operating a commercial vehicle. P. 3, L.
15-17, P. 5, L. 20-24.

3.

Prior to taking the blood alcohol concentration test,
Peck was not advised of consequences to his CDL.

P. 3,

L. 18-19, P. 5, L. 25, P. 6, L. 1-4.
4.

Prior to taking the blood alcohol concentration test,
Peck was not advised of consequences of Idaho Code §
49-335(2).

7.
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P. 3, L. 24-25, P. 4, L. 1-25, P. 5, L. 1-

ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Appellant Peck's statement of the issues on appeal is as
follows:
(a)

Was the Peck fully infor.med of the consequences of

testing confor.ming to due process (procedural) for a CDL
disqualification?
(b)

Is there a legitimate state concern confor.ming to due

process (substantive) met by disqualifying the Peck's CDL when he
was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of the conduct
and when his license was subjected to the ALS suspension?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The Appellant Peck seeks an award attorney fees on appeal
against the Respondent State of Idaho, Department Of
Transportation pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4

ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
I.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A
PERSON'S COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE
The standard of review for a decision by the State of Idaho,

Department of Transportation to disqualify a person's commercial
driver's license was stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals (in a
case dealing with an ALS suspension) in Bennett v. State, Dept.
of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 142-43,

(Ct. App. 2009), as follows:

The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (I.D.A.P.A.)
governs the review of department decisions to deny, cancel,
suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's
license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In
an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in
its appellate capacity under I.D.A.P.A., this Court reviews
the agency record independently of the district court's
decision. Marsha~~ v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 137 Idaho 337,
340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct.App.2002). This Court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1);
Marshal~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court
instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Cor,p., 130
Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marsha~l, 137
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's
factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court,
even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency,
so long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County,
ex re~. Bd. of Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742
(2000); Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful
procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the
agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a
manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial
right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette
County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d
583, 586 (1998); Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it
shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings
as necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3).
The appellate Court applies this standard on review for a CDL
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5

disqualification case.
II.

THIS CASE IS THE COL DISQUALIFICATION CHALLENGE
This appeal is regarding the Peck's rights under the U.S.

Constitution and the Idaho Constitution to notice prior to being
subjected to search and seizure for alcohol testing (procedural
due process) and not being subjected to an arbitrary act
(substantive due process).

There are several different

consequences that Peck faced flowing from the traffic stop and the
breach alcohol content ("BAC") testing to which he was subjected.
From his arrest and testing, Peck faced a criminal charge of
driving under the influence under Title 18, Idaho Code.
charge was resolved in the criminal process.

That

Peck also faced a

driver's license "ALS Suspension" under Title 18, Idaho Code,
which has been resolved as set forth in Peck v. Idaho Department
of Transportation, 153 Idaho 37 (Ct.App. 2012).

Peck also faces

this driver's license "COL Disqualification" under Title 46,
Chapter 3, Idaho Code.
disqualification.

This matter is Peck's challenge of the CDL

The Idaho Court of Appeals in Peck's Title 18,

Idaho Code suspension case, recognized that Peck's Title 49, Idaho
Code disqualification was not before them.

III. PECK HAS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Idaho Code § 49-335 Disqualifications and penalties-Commercial driver's license, under subsection (2) provides that
Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who
holds a class A, B or C driver's license is disqualified
from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of
not less than one (1) year if the person refuses to submit
to or submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6

alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substances concentration
while operating a motor vehicle.
Peck has both substantive due process and procedural due
process rights under the Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution as it relates to the CDL
Disqualification provisions of Idaho Code § 49-335.
As set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals regarding
procedural due process in In re Suspension of Driver's License of
Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 945-46 (Ct.App. 2006),
Although Gibbar does not distinguish whether he argues a
violation of the Due Process Clauses of the United States or
Idaho Constitution, the due process guarantees derived from
the two constitutions are substantially the same. Rudd v.
Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115, 666 P.2d 639, 642 (1983). Because
the suspension of issued driver's licenses involves state
action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensees, drivers' licenses may not be taken away without
procedural due process. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112, 97
S.Ct. 1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, 179-80 (1977); Be~~ v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d
90, 94-95 (1971); State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 3-4, 704
P.2d 333, 335-36 (1985). Courts must consider three factors
in procedural due process challenges:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Mathews v. E~dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903,
47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33(1976).
As set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeal regarding
substantive due process in State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 699
(Ct. App. 2001)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
administration of a blood alcohol test is a seizure of the
person and a search for evidence within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
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Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16
L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woole~, 116 Idaho 368, 370,
775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483,
680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App.1984). Warrantless searches or
seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless they come
within one of several judicially recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New H~shire, 403 U.S.
443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 57576(1971); Woole~, 116 Idaho at 370, 775 P.2d at 1212.
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. State v. Rodriguez, 128
Idaho 521, 523, 915 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Ct.App.1996). Idaho's
driver licensing scheme provides, as a condition of
possessing a valid license, that a driver of a motor vehicle
is deemed to have consented to an evidentiary test for blood
alcohol concentration where there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the person has been driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the DUI
laws. Idaho Code § 18-8002(1); McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho
182, 187, 804 P.2d 911, 916 (Ct.App.1990); see also South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S.Ct. 916, 920, 74
L.Ed.2d 748, 755-56 (1983).
Also, as set forth in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833-834
(Idaho 2002) the warrantless search exception is based upon
implied consent.

Implied consent requires notice of one's rights

and the consequences.

As explained in Matter of Virgil, 126

Idaho 946, 947 (Ct.App. 1995) citing Matter of Griffiths, 113
Idaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 98 (1987), a driver's license is
cannot be suspended or disqualified if the driver is "not
completely advised of his rights and duties."
A.

Peck's Substantive Due Process Rights Were Violated
Because He Was Not Operating A Commercial Vehicle And
Served The ALS Suspension Period

Substantive due process protection means that the reason for
depriving a driver of a license cannot be arbitrary. See In re
McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 189,

(Ct.App.1990).

Peck was not

operating a commercial motor vehicle at the time of his contact
with law enforcement.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8

The Title 18, Idaho Code ALS license

suspension (which includes the suspension of any commercial
driving privileges held) has been upheld as meeting legitimate
state police powers, rather than being double jeopardy or
arbitrary when compared to a criminal conviction and criminal
license suspension.

There is no basis for another additional

"disqualification" under Title 49 of a person's commercial
driving privileges beyond the Title 18 suspension.
additional legitimate state concern to be met.

There is no

Although in Buell

v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 151 Idaho 257 (Ct.App. 2011), the Idaho
Court of Appeals held that Title 49 disqualification is not
double jeopardy in regards to the Title 18 suspension, the Court
did not address substantive due process.

The disqualification is

arbitrary, as the underlying conduct has no relation to the
disqualified conduct of operating a commercial vehicle for a
year.

Also, the legitimate state purpose of removing unsafe

drivers for a period of time is met by the ALS suspension of all
driving privileges (including any commercial component).
The hearing officer did not address Peck's arguments
regarding substantive due process.

The District Court found that

Peck's substantive due process rights were not violated given
that removing unsafe drivers from the roadway is a legitimate
state interest.

The ALS suspension serves and in this matter did

serve that very purpose in that it suspended all of Peck's
driving privileges (including CDL privileges) for a period of
time set by the Idaho legislature.

This additional

disqualification for an extended time period does not serve any
additional purpose of removing unsafe drivers beyond the period
already established in the ALS suspension provisions.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9

The ALS

provisions have been held to meet that objective.

See Williams

v. State, Dept. of Transportation, 153 Idaho 380 (Ct.App. 2012).

B.

Peck's Procedural Due Process Rights Were Violated
Because He Was Not Advised Of The Consequences
Necessary For Informed Implied Consent

Procedural due process protection means that a person must
be completely advised of his rights and the consequences.

The

Idaho statutes providing for undertaking alcohol testing in Idaho
Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A are based upon and only upheld under
the theory of implied consent.

The statutory fiction of implied

consent is conditioned upon notice of the consequences being
given to the driver immediately prior to the testing.
informed implied consent.

This is

Without proper notice (information),

the driver has not given implied consent and the license cannot
be suspended.

The evidence necessary for a COL disqualification

therefore also requires implied consent, which requires proper
notice (being informed) prior to testing.

Without proper and

adequate notice, the disqualification cannot be imposed.

The

disqualification is based upon the search and seizure producing
the BAC results and therefore, to be upheld, must be part of the
notice given to obtain the BAC results.
This is because evidentiary testing for blood alcohol is a
seizure of the person and a search for evidence.

In order to

have a search and seizure, a driver's informed or implied consent
must be based upon an accurate advice of the consequences.

Here,

prior to the request for testing, there is no advice given that a
person's COL privileges are impacted differently than the other
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10

driving privileges identified in the advisory (one year as
opposed to 90 days, etc.).
advice.

As such, there is not sufficient

The law requires the advice to be given to the driver to

"validate" the implied or informed consent.
Implied consent requires notice of one's rights and the
consequences.

As no notice is given of the disqualification

provisions of Idaho Code § 49-335(2), there is no implied and no
informed consent.

Thus without being informed of the statutory

provision, the testing is not upon consent, and violates due
process.
The statutory advisory language in the notice given to Peck
only advises a driver of the Title 18 consequences, which are
sufficient to uphold the Title 18 suspension.

The statutory

advisory language provided to Peck does not advise of the Title
49 consequences.

As such the Title 49 disqualification cannot be

imposed or upheld.
This is the very issue that the Idaho Supreme Court
foreshadowed in the case of Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transp.,
150 Idaho 164, 166 (2011).

The Court, in considering an untimely

request for hearing on an Idaho Code §18-8002A ALS notice of
suspension for driving privileges, after reviewing the provisions
of the standard notice given, stated that:
The Notice did not address the situation presented by the
underlying facts of this case: the consequences of refusing
or failing evidentiary testing for the holder of a CDL who
was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of
contact with law enforcement. This is significant because
I.C. § 49-335(2) provides that a motorist who fails
evidentiary testing is disqualified from operating a
commercial vehicle for not less than one year.
Wanner, 150 Idaho at 166.
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The Idaho Court of Appeals in the Buell case only dealt with
the start date of a CDL disqualification, not the due process
challenge argued here.

Although the ultimate issue of the CDL

disqualification in Wanner, which the Idaho Supreme Court
expressly recognized in the opinion, was not reached, the Court
strongly warned that the failure to advise was significant.

Peck

was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of his contact
with law enforcement and providing the alcohol testing.

Peck was

not advised of the CDL Disqualification consequences, and
therefore implied consent as to the disqualification was not
obtained, and the disqualification is invalid.

IV.

PECK SEEKS AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §
12-117
Idaho Code § 12-117 (effective May 31, 2009 through March

27, 2012) provided as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any
administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding
involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political
subdivision or the court, as the case may be, shall award
the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness
fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law.
(2) If a party to an administrative proceeding or to a
civil judicial proceeding prevails on a portion of the case,
and the state agency or political subdivision or the court,
as the case may be, finds that the nonprevailing party acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to
that portion of the case, it shall award the partially
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees
and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion
of the case on which i t prevailed.
(3) Expenses awarded against a state agency or
political subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid
from funds in the regular operating budget of the state
agency or political subdivision. If sufficient funds are not
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 12

available in the budget of the state agency, the expenses
shall be considered a claim governed by the provisions of
section 67-2018, Idaho Code. If sufficient funds are not
available in the budget of the political subdivision, the
expenses shall be considered a claim pursuant to chapter 9,
title 6, Idaho Code. Every state agency or political
subdivision against which litigation expenses have been
awarded under this act shall, at the time of submission of
its proposed budget, submit a report to the governmental
body which appropriates its funds in which the amount of
expenses awarded and paid under this act during the fiscal
year is stated.
(4) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Person" shall mean any individual, partnership,
corporation, association or any other private organization;
(b) "Political subdivision" shall mean a city, a county
or any taxing district.
(c) "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in
section 67-5201, Idaho Code.
(5) If the amount pleaded in an action by a person is
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) or less, the
person must satisfy the requirements of section 12-120,
Idaho Code, as well as the requirements of this section
before he or she may recover attorney's fees, witness fees
or expenses pursuant to this section.
Idaho Code § 12-117 (effective March 27, 2012) entitled
"Attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses awarded in certain
instances" provides as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a
political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
(2) If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of
the case, and the state agency or political subdivision or
the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, finds
that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the
case, i t shall award the partially prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case
on which it prevailed.
(3) Expenses awarded against a state agency or
political subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13

from funds in the regular operating budget of the state
agency or political subdivision. If sufficient funds are not
available in the budget of the state agency, the expenses
shall be considered a claim governed by the provisions of
section 67-2018, Idaho Code. If sufficient funds are not
available in the budget of the political subdivision, the
expenses shall be considered a claim pursuant to chapter 9,
title 6, Idaho Code. Every state agency or political
subdivision against which litigation expenses have been
awarded under this act shall, at the time of submission of
its proposed budget, submit a report to the governmental
body which appropriates its funds in which the amount of
expenses awarded and paid under this act during the fiscal
year is stated.
(4) In any civil judicial proceeding involving as
adverse parties a governmental entity and another
governmental entity, the court shall award the prevailing
party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses. For purposes of this subsection,
"governmental entity" means any state agency or political
subdivision.
(5) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Person" means any individual, partnership, limited
liability partnership, corporation, limited liability
company, association or any other private organization;
(b) "Political subdivision" means a city, a county, any
taxing district or a health district;
(c) "Proceeding" means any administrative proceeding,
administrative judicial proceeding, civil judicial
proceeding or petition for judicial review or any appeal
from any administrative proceeding, administrative judicial
proceeding, civil judicial proceeding or petition for
judicial review.
(d) "State agency" means any agency as defined in
section 67-5201, Idaho Code.
(6) If the amount pleaded in an action by a person is
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, the person
must satisfy the requirements of section 12-120, Idaho Code,
as well as the requirements of this section before he or she
may recover attorney's fees, witness fees or expenses
pursuant to this section.
This matter first arose in 2009 by a letter from ITO.
judicial review was commenced June 5, 2012.

The

Peck seeks an award

of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 against the State
of Idaho, Department of Transportation.
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Idaho Code § 12-117

governs the award of attorney fees in proceedings between persons
and state agencies.
Peck asserts substantively that the state cannot

~pose

an

additional CDL disqualification for any legitimate purpose when
the ALS suspension is already the mechanism for removing unsafe
drivers and substantively a CDL disqualification is not reasonably
related to the conduct of not driving a commercial vehicle at the
time.

Peck asserts procedurally that for the State to have

~plied

consent to apply to the use of the BAC results to a CDL

suspension, there must be informed consent at the time of the BAC
testing.

Just because the ALS was upheld (given the advice of the

ALS consequences), that does not mean that the CDL
disqualification procedure met due process.
The policy behind I.C. § 12-117 is: "1) to serve as a
deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and 2) to
provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should ha[ve] made."
Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 685 (1994)
(quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho
854, 859 (1984».
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CONCLUSION
Based upon either substantive due process or procedural due
process (or both, although not required), the Title 49 Notice of
Disqualification given to Peck must be vacated.

The hearing

officer's decision and the District Court's decision should be
vacated based upon (a) violates statutory or constitutional
provisions;

(b) exceeds the agency's statutory authority;

made upon unlawful procedure;

(c) is

(d) is not supported by substantial

evidence in the record; and/or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of July, 2013.

i:d'~'I~ ~.
JJHN A. FINNEY

INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Appellant PECK
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